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In order to defi ne and implement the most effective measures to overcome the diffi culties of the 
post-crisis period, the policy-makers of ECB must identify not just main weaknesses of each bank-
ing system, but their strong points also. This requires the application of multi-criteria analysis, 
considering that policy-makers need to take into account a number of different aspects that, on the 
whole, indicate the quality of the banking system. Our aim is a comparative analysis of European 
banking systems right after the Brexit moment and within the framework of the tight new Basel III 
regulations. In this paper, we have ranked the banking systems of the 28 EU member states using 
multi-criteria analysis, specifi cally the PROMETHEE II method. The use of the PROMETHEE II 
method in combination with the entropy method offers a comprehensive insight into the banking 
system of each member state, given that the observed countries are ranked according to 9 confl ict-
ing criteria that are mostly used in banking system analysis. Our analysis shows that the banking 
systems in Central and Eastern Europe are the best performers, while the EMU’s developed bank-
ing systems such as the German, Italian, British, and French one are positioned among the last 
ranked. The Portuguese and Greek banking systems are, as expected, ranked in the last positions 
in our list. The obtained results also pointed out that the ECB should change its approach to the 
management and further development of a European Banking Union.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Basel III Accord will greatly impact the European banking sector. The new 
regulations request additional Tier 1 capital, short-term liquidity, and long-term 
funding. It seems that the existing gaps are greater in Europe than in the US. Closing 
them will have a substantial impact on profitability. Basel III will reduce return on 
equity (ROE) for the average bank by about 4 percentage points in Europe from 
the pre-crisis level of 15 percent. Banks are already seeking to manage ROE in the 
new environment by cutting costs and adjusting prices (Härle et al. 2010).
After the crisis, the regulatory developments and the current low interest rate 
pose challenges. In some countries, the large stock of non-performing assets is 
also a problem (Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, and Portugal). The average European 
non-performing ratio, around 5%, is high by international standards and exceeds 
those of the US and the UK. This ratio remains high in the majority of European 
countries that were most affected by the financial crisis (Constâncio 2016). 
The Central and Eastern European (CEE) banking sectors were more resilient 
before the crisis than Western European ones, and they regained their profitability 
after the last crisis. Most of them performed well because they were not signifi-
cantly exposed to toxic assets or sub-prime loans. Some CEE countries (princi-
pally Bulgaria and Romania) had a high share of long-term loans denominated in 
foreign currency and a high non-performing loans ratio (Radulescu 2014). This 
was largely contributed by the fact that those countries did not rush to reform their 
banking system, while other CEE countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic, and Slovakia were among the first and the most rapid reformers. 
The global financial crisis revealed that the Baltic region is exposed to above-
average earnings risks. The Baltic states are small, open economies and their 
economic activities varied a lot during the crisis. These cyclic fluctuations greatly 
affected the banking sector, raising the level of non-performing loans and lower-
ing the ROA and ROE much below the EU average. The performance of Baltic 
banking sectors improved after 2011 (Titko et al. 2015).
All of these issues raise concerns over how the European banking systems will 
perform in the future. If we add the Brexit issue, we have an interesting challenge 
for this research. The protracted economic problems and the inadequate manage-
ment of economic policy in the EU increased social discontent that may have 
eventually contributed to Brexit. The short- and long-run impacts of the deci-
sion are difficult to judge, given that the conditions of the exit are not yet known 
(Váradi et al. 2016). 
European banks are undergoing a real-life stress test in the wake of Britain’s 
vote to leave the European Union. Their share prices were already down after 
the referendum result was announced. Some banking systems that have already 
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shown some weaknesses became more unstable after this historical change in the 
EU. The best examples are Italy and Portugal. Italian banks, as a whole, have a 
high level of non-performing loans, whose total amount has been rising since the 
financial crisis. Greek banks also had great problems in maintaining liquidity, 
profitability, and the level of capitalisation. Although the state has recapitalised 
its banks three times, it has had almost no effect. Conversely, the German banking 
system, the leading one in the near past, eventually lost its capitalisation, liquid-
ity, and profitability. These are just a few examples, illustrating that the banking 
industry is set for many other radical changes after Brexit. 
Bearing the above in mind, our aim is to compare the performances of EU 
banking systems and underline their strong points and weaknesses right after the 
Brexit moment (June 2016) and within the framework of the tight new Basel III 
regulations. We have ranked the EU banking systems using multi-criteria analy-
sis, specifically the PROMETHEE II method. The ranking was performed for 
all 28 EU countries according to the values of ratios expressing the profitability, 
the soundness, and the risks undertaken by the banking systems, as they result 
from many studies that focused on the relation between the performance ratios 
of the banking systems worldwide. We used the data for the end of the second 
quarter of 2016, right after UK voted for Brexit and right after the moment when 
the Italian, Portuguese, German, and Greek banking systems began to signal im-
portant liquidity, capitalisation, and debt problems. The weights for these banks’ 
performance determinants have been established using the entropic method to 
ensure an objective definition of the weights. The use of the PROMETHEE II 
method enabled the identification of each EU country rank, with the strong points 
and weaknesses of their banking systems. The main contribution of our research 
is conducting the multi-criteria analysis for all national banking sectors in the EU 
area, not only for some selected banks belonging to one national banking system 
as other authors have done so far.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature on multi-
criteria analysis in the banking sector. Section 3 presents the methodology we 
used. Section 4 discusses the results for the best or poorest ranked EU banking 
systems. Section 5 concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The banking system stability is important for the EU because it is considered that 
the banking systems of member countries have to converge and form a banking 
union. The existence of a banking union, on the other hand, has an important role 
in supporting the Single Market, the need for which emerged from the financial 
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crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. However, the idea of  the 
European Banking Union (EBU) has not yet been accepted by all EU member 
states. Member countries of the European Monetary Union (EMU) automatically 
also become members of the EBU, while EU member countries outside EMU are 
not eligible to join the EBU. However, these countries may, after notification of 
a request to the ECB, establish “close cooperation” with the ECB. Bearing this in 
mind, Vollmer (2016) investigated the consequences of incomplete regulatory in-
tegration within a common market and came to the conclusion that EBU failed to 
integrate all relevant political actors into the common regulatory framework and 
that CEE countries should reconsider their current position towards EBU mem-
bership, given the presently stable financial sectors in these countries. This could 
change, however, if the present member states of the EBU intensify their coopera-
tion and unify their positions, resulting in a marginalisation of opt-in countries 
within the ECB and the European Union.
In contrast, some authors advocated necessity of greater integration and coor-
dination among EU banking systems. The study of Schoenmaker – Peek (2014) 
showed that, at the aggregate level the Baltics, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Spain 
and Italy in particular were hit by a strong decline in lending in the wake of the 
financial crisis. The study showed the vulnerability of emerging Europe and pe-
ripheral European countries to adverse developments in foreign banking groups 
from Western Europe. The Western banking systems contracted both on the to-
tal banking system and on foreign participation within the total banking system. 
During the crisis, the concentration of the banking systems decreased in the CEE 
region, while it increased in the peripheral European countries. Western banks 
propagated the crisis eastwards by reducing the credit supply to both existing 
and potential borrowers in emerging Europe, faster than the domestic banks (De 
Haas et al. 2015). This means that emerging Europe should improve supervisory 
coordination within the euro zone in the future to prevent the crisis.
Iwanicz-Drozdowska et al. (2016) analysed the costs of bank restructuring 
measures undertaken in the EU countries during the global financial crisis under 
the state aid framework. They found that the most important determinant was the 
level of capital adequacy, while the most cost-consuming tool was the liquidation 
of a bank. They also concluded that the banking union project within the euro 
zone and the single rule book in the entire EU may help to treat all banks in a 
similar way. However, due to limited human resources, supervisors may not be 
able to conduct on-site and off-site inspections with the required frequency. 
Căpraru – Ihnatov (2015) investigated the influence of new member accession 
on banking performance. They came to the conclusion that new member states 
(NMSs) had influenced EU-15 bank performances only in terms of net interest 
margin (NIM), and that the effect was negative. They suggested to authorities a 
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better supervision for credit risk and liquidity as well as maintaining a competi-
tive banking environment, and to banks’ management to monitor credit risk indi-
cators, optimising costs and diversifying the sources of income.
Some new studies stressed the impact of Brexit on bank performance. This 
is especially true for members that have drastically opened their banking mar-
kets and for those countries that already have some problems with banking sys-
tem capitalisation, soundness, and liquidity. In order to investigate the impact of 
Brexit on the EU banking system, Schiereck et al. (2016) analysed the stock and 
credit default swap (CDS) market reactions around the membership referendum 
(“Brexit”) on June 23, 2016, and the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy filing on Sep-
tember 15. Their conclusion was that the short-term drop in stock prices after 
the Brexit announcement was more pronounced than after Lehman’s bankruptcy, 
particularly for EU banks. Bearing in mind that shocks like this can have great 
influence on the EU as a whole, but also on each member country, it is necessary 
for the ECB to obtain a detailed and comprehensive insight into the current state 
of the banking system in each country. In this way, the ECB would be able to 
define measures that are adjusted to some groups of countries with similar char-
acteristics of their banking system and even to each member country.
The application of multi-criteria methods in the comparative analysis of na-
tional banking systems is relatively new. There are few papers that used the multi-
criteria analysis in banking sector research. Most of them are aimed at ranking the 
selected banks in some national economies according to their performances, ex-
pressed by an adequate set of representative indicators. Rosenzweig et al. (2013) 
used goal programming as a multi-criteria method for ranking the 10 biggest 
commercial banks in Croatia by three groups of indicators. Similarly, Cetin K. 
– Cetin E. (2010) ranked 13 Turkish banks according to their financial ratios, 
using the VIKOR method of multi-criteria analysis. Besides VIKOR, Wu et al. 
(2009) used also Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS) and Simple Average Weight (SAW) to evaluate the performances of 
three selected banks. The relative weights of the chosen evaluation indexes were 
calculated by Fuzzy Analytic Hierarchy Process (FAHP). The results indicate that 
multi-criteria techniques can also be a successful tool for bank management.
Bayyurt (2013) applied TOPSIS, ELECTRE III and Data Envelopment Analy-
sis (DEA), as multi-criteria decision-making methodologies to investigate wheth-
er foreign ownership contributes to bank performances in developing countries. 
The mean ranks of TOPSIS scores and ELECTRE III results were compared for 
testing the performances of domestic and foreign banks. The results suggested 
that foreign banks had better performance than domestic ones. 
Önder – Hepşen (2013) went one step further and used multi-criteria analysis 
in combination with time series techniques for forecasting the financial perform-
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ance of Turkish banks. Using the different time series techniques, they predicted 
the financial performances of 17 banks. After selecting the best forecasting tech-
nique, they used the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method to calculate the 
weights needed for the application of TOPSIS on selected forecasted bank per-
formances. The same combination of multi-criteria methods was also used by 
Seçme et al. (2009), Mandic et al. (2014), and Çelen (2014).
One of the papers that use PROMETHEE II method in the analysis of bank per-
formance is a study by Doumpos – Zopounidis (2010). They selected criteria for 
ranking selected Greek banks that comply with the CAMELS framework. Their 
overall conclusion was that multi-criteria methods should be used by expert bank 
analysts as supportive tools in their daily practice for bank performance monitor-
ing and evaluation. These authors also published several other papers regarding 
the application of multi-criteria methods in banking and finance, e.g. Spathis et 
al. (2002), Doumpos – Zopounidis (2002), Doumpos et al. (2009), and Gaganis 
et al. (2010).
The contribution of our paper is the use of the entropy method in combination 
with the PROMETHEE II method, aiming at ranking the national banking sys-
tems (not particular banks) in order to compare their performances and to identify 
their strong points and weaknesses. Based on an analysis along these lines, any 
regulatory authority such as the ECB, EBA, etc., can draw conclusions about the 
current state of EU banking systems and identify some group of countries with 
similar characteristics of banking system as well as the advantages and disadvan-
tages of each member country. Also, the use of the entropy method indicates the 
areas where the differences between countries are higher, so authorities should 
focus on those areas when creating converge measures. 
3. METHODOLOGY
The Preference Ranking Organisation Method for Enrichment Evaluations (PRO-
METHEE) is one of the most prominent multi-criteria methods that can be effec-
tively used to solve very complex decision-making problems. The PROMETHEE 
method has certain advantages in comparison to other well-known Multiple-
 Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method. The most important is that it has 
good software support, which enables the additional processing and presentation 
of the obtained results, such as the PROMETHEE Rainbow, action profiles, and 
GAIA visual assistance used in this paper. 
RANKING OF EU NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEMS 479
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
3.1. The PROMETHEE methodology
In recent years, a large number of methods for decision support have been de-
veloped in order to facilitate finding the best compromise solution. One of 
them is certainly the PROMETHEE family of outranking methods that was de-
veloped by Brans (1982) and further extended by Brans – Vincke (1985) and 
Brans – Mareschal (1995). Several versions of the PROMETHEE method were 
developed, e.g. PROMETHEE I (partial ranking), PROMETHEE II (complete 
ranking), PROMETHEE III (ranking based on intervals), PROMETHEE IV 
(continuous case), PROMETHEE GAIA (geometrical analysis for interactive 
assistance), PROMETHEE V (MCDA including segmentation constraints), and 
PROMETHEE VI (representation of the human brain). 
The PROMETHEE II method used in this research is an adequate method for 
solving problems whose aim is a multi-criteria ranking of a final set of alterna-
tives (in this case, EU countries) based on a number of criteria that need to be 
maximised or minimised. For each observed alternative, this method calculates 
its value expressed in level of preferences. Thereby, each alternative is evalu-
ated based on the two preference flows: positive preference flow φ + (P) and the 
negative flow of preference φ – (P). Next, the PROMETHEE II method accounts 
net preference flow φ (P) as the difference between these two flows. To calculate 
mentioned flows, the PROMETHEE II method requires the specification of ap-
propriate parameters for each criterion (Brans et al. 1984; Brans – Vincke1985):
1.  Direction of preference, minimising or maximising;
2.  Weight coefficients, indicating the importance of certain criteria;
3.  Adequate preference function, that converts the difference between the two 
alternatives in the level of preference (Linear, Usual, U-shape, V-shape, Level, 
and Gaussian);
4.  Preference threshold (p), which represents the minimum deviation that a deci-
sion-maker considers important for decision-making;
5.  Indifference threshold (q), which represents the maximum deviation that a 
decision-maker considers irrelevant for decision-making;
6.  S threshold, which presents the value between the q indifference threshold and 
the p preference threshold, and it is used for Gaussian preference function.
The PROMETHEE II methodology is used for ranking i alternatives (where 
i = 1,2, …m) according to j criteria (where j = 1,2, …m), which consist of the 
following steps (Behzadian et al. 2010):
1.  First, deviation based on comparison of a pair of alternatives for the j criteria 
is calculated
 ( ( ) ), ) (j j jd a b g a g b   (1)
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where dj(a,b) represent differences between the value of alternative a and b ac-
cording to each criterion.
2. Next, the chosen function of preferences is used:
 ( ) ( ), ,j j jP a b F d a b     (2)
where Pj(a,b) represents preferences alternative a for each alternative b within 
every criteria, as a function of dj(a,b).
3. The general index of preferences is calculated:
 
1
, ( , ) ,( )
n
j j
j
a b A a b P a b wπ

    (3)
where π(a,b) stands for weighted sum Pj(a,b) for each criteria, while wj stands for 
weighted j criteria coefficient.   
4. Next, the positive and negative courses of preferences are calculated:
 1( ) ( , )1
x A
a a xmφ π


    (4)
  (5)
where φ+ represents positive and φ– negative preferences values for each alterna-
tive.
5. Finally, positive and negative courses of preferences are used to calculate net 
flow of preferences and rank alternatives:
 ( ) ( ) ( )a a aφ φ φ
    (6)
where φ(a) stands for the net course for each alternative.
On the bias of φ(a) value, the countries are ranked from best to the worst, ac-
cording to all observed criteria. 
3.2. The entropy method
An appropriate approach for determining the weights of selected indicators is 
essential for solving MCDM problems. Generally, weights can be classified into 
subjective weights and objective weights depending on the information source 
(Hwang – Lin 1987). Subjective weights reflect the subjective judgment or in-
tuition of the decision making (DM), and they can be obtained from the prefer-
ence information given by the DM directly through interviews, questionnaires, or 
1( ) ( , )1
x A
a x amφ π


  
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trade-off interrogations. Objective weights are derived from objective informa-
tion such as the decision matrix (Chen – Li 2011). In order to obtain the quality 
multi-criteria analysis of banking systems in EU countries, we used the objec-
tive definition of weights. The most well-known method of generating objective 
weights is the entropy method (Hwang – Yoon 1981, Zeleny 1982, and Zou et al. 
2006). It first appeared in thermodynamics and was later introduced to informa-
tion theory by Shannon (1984). It is now widely used in ecology, engineering, 
medicine, economy, finance, etc., by Guo (2001), Li et al. (2004), Zou et al. 
(2006), Chuansheng et al. (2012), and Ermatita et al. (2012). 
Information entropy is measurement of the disorder degree of a system (Meng 
1989). It can measure the amount of useful information with the data provided. 
When the difference of the value among the evaluating objects on the same indi-
cator is high, while the entropy is small, it illustrates that this indicator provides 
more useful information, and that the weight of this indicator should be set ac-
cordingly high. On the other hand, if the difference is smaller and the entropy is 
higher, the relative weight should be smaller (Qiu 2002). 
The entropy method is conducted as follows (Qiu 2002): The first step in the 
application of the entropy method is the normalisation of original evaluating 
matrix. Suppose there are evaluating indicators counted m, evaluating objects 
counted n, they form an original indicators value matrix X ═ (xij)mxn
  (7)
The normalisation of this matrix gives Equation (8):
 ( )ij mxnR r  (8)
where rij is the data of the ith evaluating object on the jth indicator, and  0,1ijr  . 
Among these indicators, which the bigger the better (increasing preference 
function of the indicator), there are:
 ( min { }) / (max { } min { }) 1 ; 1ij ij ij ij ijr x j x j x j x i m j n        (9)
while, the smaller the better (decreasing preference function of the indicator), 
there are:
 ( ) (max { }) ) / (max { } min { }) 1 ; 1ij ij ij ij ijr j x x j x j x i m j n        (10)
1 2 1
1 2 2
1 2
1 1
2 2
, ,
, , .
, ,
n
n
m m mn
x x x
X x x x
x x x

 

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The next step is the definition of the entropy. In the n indicators, m evaluating 
objects evaluation problem, the entropy of jth indicator is defined as:
  (11)
in which  k = 1/ln m and suppose when rij = 0, lnrij = 0.
Finally, the last step is the definition of the weight of entropy. The weight of 
entropy of jth indicator could be defined as:
  (12)
in which  dj = 1 – Hj is the degree of diversification for jth indicator (j = 1…n), 
and 0 ≤ wj ≤ 1, 
1
1
n
j
j
w

  .
3.3. Data and the multi-criteria model formulation 
In order to investigate the banking sector performances of EU countries, a multi-
criteria analysis has been conducted using the Visual PROMETHEE software 
package. It has the ability to present the results graphically and thus to provide a 
more complete picture of the observed problem. The PROMETHEE II method 
requires the definition of certain parameters for each indicator. We used 9 indica-
tors for 28 countries. Table 1 presents the raw data of our multi-criteria model and 
identifies the source of our data (Eurgean Banking Authorities).
As it can be seen from Table 1, six indicators should be maximised and three 
should be minimised. Also, the linear preference function, with appropriate pref-
erence threshold and indifference threshold, was applied (as the Visual PRO-
METHEE software suggested according to the data dispersion). The weights for 
all observed indicators have been defined by the entropy method. It is interest-
ing to analyse the obtained weights presented in Table 1. The coverage ratio of 
non-performing loans and advances has the highest weight coefficient (19.99%), 
indicating the highest differences in this area among EU members. The increase 
in the coverage ratio in most countries is evident (except in Denmark, France, the 
United Kingdom, Hungary, Latvia, and Spain), probably as the result of higher 
regulatory scrutiny in relation to the AQR as well as the negative developments 
of collateral values leading to an increase in impairment. But the increase is dif-
ferent among member countries (being the highest in Cyprus, Germany, Greece, 
Luxemburg, Malta, and the Netherlands), which caused the significant dispersion 
of data for this indicator (EBA 2016). The next indicator according to the value 
1
ln , 1,2, ,
m
j ij ij
i
H k r r j n

   
1 1
1
(1 )
j
j n n
jj j
Hdjw
dj H 
   
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Table 1. Evaluation matrix of the national banking systems in 28 EU countries
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Unit ratio ratio ratio ratio ratio percent ratio ratio ratio
Min/max max min max max max max min min max
Weight 0.0753 0.0934 0.1999 0.0546 0.0706 0.1403 0.1048 0.1752 0.0860
Preference 
function Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear
Thresholds absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute absolute
q 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.08 3.82 0.10
p 0.09 0.24 0.24 0.14 0.02 0.02 0.20 9.15 0.20
s 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EE 0.3589 0.0155 0.2884 0.1402 0.0235 0.0191 0.4158 5.0525 0.2189
SE 0.2485 0.0103 0.2824 0.1287 0.0066 0.0099 0.4834 19.7247 0.2952
FI 0.2417 0.0146 0.2789 0.0847 0.0043 0.0066 0.4880 19.0645 0.3058
MT 0.2191 0.0564 0.3943 0.1322 0.0093 0.0188 0.4701 13.0363 0.5063
NL 0.2127 0.0268 0.3635 0.0813 0.0043 0.0153 0.6035 18.1441 0.2012
DK 0.2117 0.0336 0.3170 0.0940 0.0050 0.0106 0.5637 18.3896 0.2621
HR 0.2042 0.1105 0.5916 0.1253 0.0177 0.0317 0.4460 5.8292 0.2582
IE 0.2009 0.1461 0.3791 0.1019 0.0101 0.0167 0.5589 8.9569 0.2591
LT 0.1984 0.0450 0.3285 0.0990 0.0119 0.0148 0.4567 8.5124 0.1806
LV 0.1964 0.0348 0.3054 0.1571 0.0192 0.0174 0.4049 8.4927 0.3242
SI 0.1953 0.1925 0.6625 0.1089 0.0143 0.0251 0.5819 6.4937 0.4694
BG 0.1951 0.1373 0.5684 0.1936 0.0247 0.0393 0.3445 6.9364 0.2946
RO 0.1940 0.1214 0.6520 0.1639 0.0187 0.0327 0.4689 7.8702 0.4883
LU 0.1831 0.0104 0.4216 0.0585 0.0044 0.0079 0.5814 12.7203 0.2319
SK 0.1817 0.0479 0.5323 0.1540 0.0159 0.0306 0.4607 8.9924 0.2815
GR 0.1802 0.4687 0.4823 –0.1618 –0.0181 0.0282 0.5123 7.5009 0.0347
BE 0.1767 0.0359 0.4308 0.0881 0.0050 0.0138 0.6394 16.9117 0.2378
CZ 0.1749 0.0268 0.6081 0.1512 0.0155 0.0246 0.4295 9.4620 0.1217
FR 0.1723 0.0393 0.5063 0.0750 0.0045 0.0128 0.6831 16.0599 0.1728
DE 0.1682 0.0263 0.3864 0.0273 0.0014 0.0115 0.7713 19.2640 0.2237
HU 0.1641 0.1394 0.6170 0.1910 0.0208 0.0426 0.6445 7.8177 0.2829
AT 0.1612 0.0599 0.5685 0.0846 0.0063 0.0177 0.7111 12.1446 0.2378
PL 0.1578 0.0680 0.6058 0.1014 0.0131 0.0295 0.5144 6.8080 0.2201
CY 0.1577 0.4743 0.3774 0.0515 0.0056 0.0286 0.5141 7.9618 0.2573
IT 0.1513 0.1640 0.4639 0.0227 0.0016 0.0151 0.6749 13.0651 0.1837
ES 0.1432 0.0596 0.4483 0.0683 0.0051 0.0222 0.5135 12.3468 0.1968
PT 0.1190 0.1966 0.4171 0.0455 –0.0035 0.0159 0.6494 12.4832 0.1550
GB 0.1529 0.0221 0.2987 0.0498 0.0032 0.0149 0.6086 15.1818 0.2280
Source: European Banking Authority: Risk Dashboard Q2 2016.
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of the weight coefficient is the debt-to-equity ratio (17.52%). This is the result 
of the fact that risks from a large debt overhang remained high in some countries 
(Sweden, Germany, Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France 
are above the EU average), while in some such as the CEE countries, the Baltics, 
Cyprus, Ireland, and Greece were far below the EU average. Significant sover-
eign exposure in the former countries leads to the elevated vulnerabilities of their 
banks, worsening the situation in this area. 
Generally observed, net interest margin in the EU is low, but differences among 
countries are still high, resulting in a high weight coefficient (14.03%). With inter-
est income under pressure in an environment of low interest rates, banks have not 
yet demonstrated that they can increase fee income. It has greatly affected their 
profitability, given that growth in loan volumes does not offset margin pressure. 
In order to increase the profitability in such circumstances, banks have shifted 
their activities to cost rationalisation by reducing overhead and staff costs as well 
as increasing automation and digitalisation. As their success in rationalisation 
was diverse, the cost-income ratio still differs a lot among EU countries, result-
ing in a relatively high weight coefficient (10.48%). A somewhat lower weight 
coefficient of 9.34% has been assigned to non-performing loans (NPL) to total 
gross loans and advances. This indicator remains high in all EU countries, but 
the differences between countries are moderate compared to the other indicators. 
Further measures and initiatives to reduce stocks of NPL are being implemented, 
but they still have to prove their success. The main vulnerabilities result from 
global economic developments, not least driven by emerging market and politi-
cal risks (the latter inside and outside the EU), as well as commodity, energy, and 
shipping exposures. 
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities have a weight coefficient of 8.60%. This is 
a relatively low weight coefficient, given that the remaining indicators and the fact 
that the fragmentation of asset quality and profitability remained high among juris-
dictions. In addition, the usage of central bank funding in part differs significantly 
between countries. Following the UK referendum, further indications of fragmen-
tation across the single market need to be monitored in order to obtain a satisfac-
tory level of the banking sector liquidity. On the other side, total capital ratio has 
also a relatively low weight indicator (7.53%), indicating that all EU members 
improved their capitalisation according to the Basel standards. This effect is jointly 
explained by the growth in capital (mainly driven by higher retained earnings) as 
well as the slight decrease of risk-weighted asset (RWAs), primarily its market 
risk components. Finally, profitability indicators, i.e. Return on assets (7.06%) and 
Return on equity (5.46%), recorded the lowest weight coefficient, although the 
dispersion among countries has been further widened in Q2 2016, indicating that 
dispersion in the remaining indicators has been even wider (EBA 2016).
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While empirical studies have shown that the PROMETHEE II method is rath-
er robust with respect to the values of the preference function thresholds, the 
weights of the criteria usually have a strong impact on the results of the analysis, 
especially when there are strongly conflicting criteria. In order to perform some 
kind of robust analysis of the obtained rankings, Table 2 presents the results of the 
sensitivity analysis obtained by Visual PROMETHEE software. 
The interval of stability defines the limits within which the range of the weight 
coefficient of the given criteria can be obtained without influencing the obtained 
result of the PROMETHEE II ranking. Here, it must be taken into considera-
tion that changes of weight can be only done by one criterion, while the relative 
weights of the other criteria stay the same (Nikolic et al. 2009). It is clear from the 
result of sensitivity analysis that debt-to-equity ratio and cost-income ratio have 
the greatest impact on the complete ranking, given that they have a narrow range 
of weights. The solution is much less sensitive to the weights of the other criteria.
4. RANKING RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The application of the PROMETHEE II method for the reference case scenario 
produced the following results for the positive preference flows φ+(a), the nega-
tive preference flows φ–(a), and the net preference flows (Table 3). 
Table 3 shows that only 11 countries have positive net preference flows, in-
dicating that those countries have better performances of their banking system 
according to most of the observed criteria. Other countries have disadvantages in 
the majority of criteria. The ranking results are presented in Figure 1.
The advantages of each country are presented in the top columns and disad-
vantages are shown below them. In order to get a better insight into how the fac-
tors influenced ranking, the country profiles will be discussed in the following.
Table 2. The results of sensitivity analysis
Indicators Weights 
Stability intervals
Min. Max.
Total capital ratio 0.0753 0.0642 0.0754
Non-performing loans to total gross loans and advances 0.0934 0.0813 0.0938
Coverage ratio of non-performing loans and advances 0.1999 0.1996 0.2134
Return on equity 0.0546 0.0407 0.0552
Return on assets 0.0706 0.0554 0.0710
Net interest margin 0.1403 0.1399 0.1639
Cost-income ratio 0.1048 0.0958 0.1049
Debt-to-equity ratio 0.1752 0.1750 0.1900
Liquid assets to short-term liabilities 0.0860 0.7970 0.0864
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Table 3. Preference flows and rankings of EU national banking systems
Countries φ+(a) φ–(a) φ(a) Rank
RO 0.4010 0.0051 0.3959 1
BG 0.4017 0.0121 0.3897 2
CR 0.3066 0.0135 0.293 3
HU 0.3422 0.0620 0.2802 4
SI 0.3154 0.0460 0.2694 5
PL 0.2519 0.0283 0.2236 6
SK 0.2313 0.0194 0.2119 7
CZ 0.2334 0.0439 0.1895 8
EE 0.2616 0.1151 0.1465 9
MT 0.1544 0.0987 0.0557 10
LV 0.1578 0.1121 0.0456 11
AT 0.1190 0.1296 –0.0105 12
LT 0.1027 0.1216 –0.0189 13
ES 0.0759 0.1005 –0.0246 14
IE 0.0757 0.1062 –0.0305 15
CY 0.1213 0.1909 –0.0696 16
LU 0.0502 0.1647 –0.1145 17
IT 0.0497 0.1917 –0.142 18
FR 0.0615 0.2099 –0.1483 19
GR 0.1478 0.3100 –0.1623 20
SE 0.0914 0.2751 –0.1836 21
BE 0.0310 0.2209 –0.1899 22
Figure 1. Country rankings with their strong points and their weaknesses
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Romania
According to our analysis, as of mid-2016, the Romanian banking system achieved 
the first position in our ranking. The advantages of the Romanian banking system 
in mid-2016 are more obvious from Figure 2.
In the first decade of the transition, the Romanian banking system faced a 
postponed privatisation process. Several banks, especially small banks went bust. 
Foreign investors control almost 90% of the total banking assets. Nevertheless, 
during the crisis, the system pro ed to be vulnerable due to the rising share of non-
performing loans and the high foreign-currency indebtedness of the private sec-
tor. A number of banks resized their networks and cut staff. The market has even 
seen negative margins because of some banks (especially the Greek ones) that 
paid deposit interest at levels higher than interbank rates to cover their financing 
needs (Bakor et al. 2012). Although it has a somewhat lower level of capitalisa-
tion, it should be noted that the Romanian banking sector has demonstrated its 
structural stability, being among the few banking sectors in the EU which did not 
need the state’s support during the crisis, while other member states supported 
their banking systems, primarily through the recapitalisation. 
Figure 2. Romania: country profile
Table 3. continued
Countries φ+(a) φ–(a) φ(a) Rank
PT 0.0358 0.2414 –0.2056 23
FI 0.0821 0.2878 –0.2057 24
NL 0.0287 0.2453 –0.2166 25
GB 0.0224 0.2510 –0.2286 26
DK 0.0350 0.2648 –0.2298 27
DE 0.0179 0.3378 –0.3199 28
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Figure 2 indicates that Romania has the greatest advantage in liquidity. Roma-
nia displays a high liquidity ratio, amounting to almost 49%. Only Malta performs 
better. Strong points of the Romanian banking system are also the net interest 
margin and the coverage of non-performing loans. The bank net interest mar-
gin displays a modest increase in 2015 in comparison to 2014, and in Q2 2016, 
Romania attained the third position among the EU countries, with a net interest 
margin amounting to 3.27%. This is the result of the high level of concentration, 
which has become more pronounced after the crisis. The level of non-performing 
loans has had the lowest effect on its best position. The Romanian banking sys-
tem could not close the gap with the levels reached during 2002–2011 for this 
ratio. Its lowest level was reached in 2014. Provisions to non-performing loans 
have recorded a real boom after 2005 up to the present. Despite their fluctuant 
developments and the fact that they decreased slowly after 2013, their level is 
higher than in the period before the crisis. With a level near 65%, Romania ranks 
in the second position in Q2 2016 after Slovenia. Debt-to-capital ratio was low 
in Romania in mid-2016, just like in Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and 
Croatia, almost half of the EU average level of near 15%. At the end, it should be 
emphasised that the direct effects of Brexit on the Romanian banking system are 
reduced because the credit institutions with capital coming from the UK are not 
present on the Romanian banking market. 
Bulgaria
With significant advantages in most of the criteria, Bulgaria has the second posi-
tion in our rankings. 
Bulgaria had the greatest advantage in the area of the net interest margin, fol-
lowed by the cost-to-income ratio and ROA. Bulgaria’s accession to the European 
Union implied entering “the single” European market and the existence of the 
single banking license. In this context, foreign banks can enter a member country 
more easily, which can determine the expansion of competition in local banking 
activity. Nevertheless, the level of competition in the Bulgarian market is still not 
satisfactory (Dobre 2015). The relatively high level of concentration has enabled 
the existing banks to achieve high yields. It is therefore no wonder that this coun-
try has achieved a high level of profitability indicators. The net interest margin 
improved a lot lately (it was around 4% in 2015) and almost closes the gap with 
the levels displayed by this ratio before the crisis (between 4.9–5.3%). Only Hun-
gary ranks better than Bulgaria as far as net interest margin is concerned, with a 
level of around 4% in both countries. Bulgaria displays the highest ROA and ROE 
ratios in the entire EU, with a level of 2.46% against an EU 0.3% average for ROA 
RANKING OF EU NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEMS 489
Acta Oeconomica 67 (2017)
and a level of 19.35% for ROE against an EU 5.6% average, while Greece and 
Portugal still have negative values of ROA and ROE. Bulgarian banks cut their 
costs from 60% in 2002 to near 34% by mid-2016. This level is much lower than 
the EU average of 62% or the German one that displays the highest cost-income 
ratio (77%). This means that banks have cut their operational cost and provided 
an efficient cost management. This country had the least significant advantage in 
the area of non-performing loans. Non-performing loans increased a lot during 
the crisis and their share is still high in Bulgaria in comparison to other CEE coun-
tries (although the non-performing loans ratio decreased in mid-2016). Corporate 
non-performing loans represent the highest proportion of bad debts, significantly 
exceeding that of households (IMF 2016) and reflecting a hold-and-wait strat-
egy of some local banks, which were reluctant to recognise bad corporate loans 
and to dispose of them (Kraeva – Clegg 2016). On the other hand, Bulgaria had 
two disadvantages, namely total capital ratio and liquidity assets ratio, but they 
have not greatly affected the ranking. Total capital ratio was above the regulatory 
minimum in mid-2016, but it was still low in comparison to other well-capitalised 
banking systems. As the authorities successfully managed the stress episode due 
to spillovers from Greece in 2015, they also succeeded to maintain the stable situ-
ation when the Brexit results were announced, indicating that the supervision of 
the banking sector by the Bulgarian National Bank is satisfactory. 
Croatia
Croatia ranks in 3rd position. After the banking crisis of 1998, which caused the 
exit of several banks from the market, the Croatian banking system faced a deep 
transformation process when state-owned banks were privatised and foreign in-
vestors gained a market share of more than 90% of total banking assets.
Figure 3. Bulgaria: country profi le
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The processes of liberalisation and adjustment to international regulatory re-
quirements progressed until the global economic crisis. During the crisis, the 
banking system showed some weaknesses (profitability ratios decreased, the non-
performing loans increased sharply, indicators of liquidity recorded a decline as 
result of a faster growth in loans than the growth of deposits, etc.). Although it was 
affected by the global crisis, the Croatian banking sector did not display losses 
and it was well capitalised. Reforms of the regulatory and supervisory framework 
after the EU accession (July 2013) improved efficiency, and thus in mid-2016, 
all analysed ratios positively contribute to the performance of its banks, except 
for the liquidity ratio. The short-term cumulative gap, which is usually negative, 
meaning that the amount of liabilities exceeds the amount of assets expected by 
banks in the respective maturity period, has been widening from the 2014 and 
reached the level of 25% in Q2 2016. It is below the level of the Romanian (48%), 
Slovenian (47%), Bulgarian (29%), Hungarian  and Slovak  banking systems 
(near 28%), but its level is still above the EU average, amounting to 21%. Items 
in the shortest maturity band of up to 15 days, the gap of which increased the 
most, had the greatest influence on the developments in the short-term cumula-
tive gap. The increase of mismatches in that maturity band is almost exclusively 
a reflection of the increase in liabilities of the same maturity. These liabilities 
increased as a result of the increase in sight deposits with transaction and savings 
accounts and provisions created for the purpose of loan conversion. At the same 
time, assets of the same maturity went up a little, regardless of noticeable changes 
in some items that had the opposite sign, such as for instance the decline in net 
loans and an increase in deposits (Croatian National Bank 2016).
It can be concluded from Figure 4 that the most significant strong point of 
the Croatian banking system is the coverage of the non-performing loans ratio, 
followed by the net interest margin, the cost-to-income ratio, and the debt-to-
equity ratio. It is interesting to mention that despite a relatively high level of 
non-performing loans, Croatia has one of the highest levels of the coverage of 
the non-performing loans ratio, which makes the non-performing loans problem 
much less pronounced. The coverage of the non-performing loans ratio showed a 
Figure 4. Croatia: country profile
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significant increase during the few past years due to the ageing of existing non-
performing loans and to the rules on the gradual increase in its value adjustments. 
The coverage ratio places Croatia in the 6th position among EU countries, with a 
level of 59%, a much higher level than the EU average level of 43%. Preceding 
Croatia are Slovenia, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. As 
the structure of funding in the sector has improved (less borrowing from finan-
cial institutions, a shift in customer deposits to current accounts), the net interest 
margin of Croatian banks increased to 3.16% in mid-2016, placing Croatia in the 
4th position among EU countries, while the EU average is much lower (1.48%). 
Preceding Croatia are CEE countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
Beside the increase of income, the main drivers of cost-income ratio reduction 
were a reduction of risk costs and a reduction of operating costs by decreasing the 
number of operating units and the number of employees, while simultaneously 
increasing the availability of their services via the ATM network. As a result of 
such cost rationalisation, the cost-income ratio is low (44.5%) and well above the 
EU average of 62.6%. Also, the debt-to-equity ratio is very low in Croatia (5.8%) 
and it is to a great extent the result of decline in issuing the debt instruments as 
the source of finance. Finally, it should be mentioned that Brexit has not directly 
affected the Croatian banking sector in the short run.
Hungary
Hungary was considered one of the best performing transition countries for a 
long time (Fischer – Sahay 2000; Weder 2001), but during the crisis period, the 
entire Hungarian macroeconomic environment got worse and this affected the 
profitability of the banking sector. It suffered significant losses for three years 
(just like the Romania) during the crisis; ROE and ROA rates dropped dramati-
cally. Business volumes declined, while risk costs rose, mainly due to further 
deterioration in the asset quality of foreign exchange loans (especially the ones 
denominated in CHF) and mandatory early repayment rules. Many banks tried to 
reduce operating costs, including closing branches. There were not many mergers 
and acquisitions at the time because of the regulatory uncertainties. Many banks 
continued to compete for retail deposits by offering rates above the interbank 
lending rate. Competition for deposits started to ease after 2012 (Bákor et al. 
2012). The programme targeting the conversion of foreign exchange-denominat-
ed loans stopped the increase of retail non-performing loans and improved the 
banking asset quality. It is obvious from Figure 5 that the most important strong 
point of the Hungarian banking system is the net interest margin, followed by the 
coverage of non-performing loans, ROE and ROA. During 2002–2007, the net 
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interest margin stayed between 4.5–5.6%. After 2008, it decreased from 4% to 
2% in 2014, but it recovered in 2015 at 4.8% and at 4.3% at mid-2016. Accord-
ing to this indicator, Hungary ranks first in the entire EU area. Although the level 
of non-performing loans is the least important advantage of Hungarian banking 
system, the country has a very high coverage of non-performing loans, enabling it 
to be among the top five in our ranking. Provisions to non-performing loans ratio 
fluctuated during the entire period and it reached 59–60% during 2014–2015. 
These levels are almost equal to the highest pre-crisis levels of 65% attained in 
2005 and 2007. In mid-2016, this ratio was 61% and Hungary was 3rd among the 
EU countries, after Slovenia (66%) and Romania (61%). The Hungarian bank-
ing sector suffered significant losses during the crisis, and ROE and ROA rates 
just dropped dramatically. The situation became even more untenable after debt 
crisis and the conversion of loans denominated in CHF, when Hungarian banks 
recorded high negative ROE for two consecutive years during the crisis in 2011–
2012 and then the banking system turned negative again in 2014. The ROE of 
Hungary’s banks rose from –0.1% in 2015 to 19.1% in mid-2016. In early 2015, 
the government agreed with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) to decrease, among other taxes, the bank tax to EU levels by 2019, 
and to transfer all direct and indirect majority equity stakes held in local banks to 
the private sector by 2017 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). ROA displayed a stable 
level between 1.5–2% before the crisis, and after the crisis this ratio decreased 
at negative levels until 2013. In 2015, it reached 0.22 percent, much lower than 
the pre-crisis levels. It recovered in 2016 at a level of 2%, ranking Hungary af-
ter Estonia (2.4%) and Bulgaria (2.3%). On the other hand, Hungary displayed 
weaknesses in the capital adequacy area (total capital ratio, –16%, below the EU 
average), liquidity area (28%), and cost-income ratio, which is still at high levels 
(64%) among CEE countries, just like in Slovenia (58%) and Poland (51%), and 
represents the most pronounced limitation of this banking system.
Figure 5. Hungary: country profile
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Slovenia
Slovenia differs in some respects from the other countries of the region. In 2003, 
only a third of the banks’ capital belonged to foreign owners. Having started from 
a more favourable position than the other CEE countries, Slovenia chose not to 
privatise banks and to limit foreign competition. It should be noted that this strat-
egy proved to be correct, as bank intermediation developed rapidly and no major 
banking crises occurred for a while (Havrylchyk – Jurzyk 2006). 
However, during the economic crisis, Slovenia was transformed from one of 
the most successful NMSs into one of the most problematic countries. Before 
2008, credit activity was extremely high in Slovenia. During the financial crisis, 
a significant decline in real estate prices provoked a deterioration. It turned out 
that many loans were inadequately secured, risk management was poor. These 
led to a decrease in net interest income. Non-performing loans increased at 30%, 
while capital adequacy decreased and was below the minimum requested level. 
Slovenia started to rehabilitate its banking sector by means of a bad bank at the 
end of 2013. The state ownership of systemic banks and political instability both 
contributed to delaying the actions taken. Compared with other countries, the 
fiscal costs of bank rehabilitation in Slovenia were low, but the delay in rehabili-
tation (which started five years after the crisis erupted) had a negative effect on 
macroeconomic indicators (Hribernik-Markovic –Tomec 2015). 
All Slovenian banks, large state-owned banks in particular, suffered great 
losses and significantly diminished their balance sheets. The government took 
further measures to stabilise the banking sector in 2014, which eased liquidity 
pressures. Confidence in the major state-owned banks returned and there was an 
inflow of retail funds from the beginning of 2014. Policy measures taken during 
2013–2014 facilitated the improvement of the banking funding, while the reduc-
tion of the loan allowed banks to repay most of their ECB borrowing. After facing 
losses during three consecutive years, the Slovenian banking sector returned to 
profitability in 2014. Net interest margins and profitability started to recover. Im-
proved profitability can be attributed to the significantly lower level of provisions 
and the growth in net interest income. Slovenia managed to save its state-owned 
banks mostly with its own funds. In 2014, the Slovenian economy rebounded 
strongly, but the high level of non-performing loans (mostly in the corporate sec-
tor) and low credit demand from creditworthy firms may have implications for 
the viability of the banking sector in the following years. Credit growth remains 
negative and banks’ profitability can be further threatened (European Commis-
sion 2015).
Slovenia has an advantage in the liquidity assets area, not in cost-to-income ra-
tio and non-performing loans area like other CEE countries. The disadvantage in 
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the cost-to-income ratio area is the result of a sharp decline of income, although 
banks reduced impairment and provisioning costs. Owing to the simultaneous 
decline in non-interest income, which was caused by a contraction in lending 
activity and a net loss from trading activities, the banking system’s gross income 
declined. As loans contract further, the banks cannot compensate for the loss 
of net interest income by increasing net non-interest income (Bank of Slovenia 
2016). Given that this country is slowly abandoning the practice of soft budget 
constraints, the high level of non-performing loans in Slovenian banks is not 
surprising. Also, the banking system liquidity is good and stable primarily due to 
the high share of Slovenian government bonds in total liquid assets. The greatest 
impact of Brexit on the Slovenian banking sector is the postponed privatisation 
of Slovenia’s largest bank, the Nova Ljubljanska Banka due to increased market 
volatility caused by the UK’s vote to leave the EU.  
The rest of EU-28 countries
The Baltic States are placed in the middle of our rankings. Estonia is the best (it 
is placed in the 9th position), followed by Latvia (11th), and Lithuania (13th). Their 
advantages are similar to those in the CEE region: non-performing loans, ROA, 
ROE, cost-to-income ratio, and debt-to-equity ratio. Unlike the CEE countries, 
the coverage of non-performing loans and the net interest margin are disadvan-
tages of all these countries. They also have disadvantages in the area of capitali-
sation and liquidity, with some exceptions. Estonia and Lithuania have a signifi-
cant advantage in the area of capitalisation, especially Estonia which is the first 
ranked EU country according to the total capital ratio level. All banks operating 
in Lithuania complied with both the minimum capital adequacy requirement and 
the combined capital buffer requirement. On the other hand, Latvia has a disad-
vantage in the capitalisation area, but it ranks well in the liquidity area, which is 
a disadvantage of the remaining Baltic countries. Generally, the banking systems 
of these countries are characterised by significant fluctuations, given that they 
are small open economies and that the major players in their banking sectors are 
Scandinavian banks (with a market share over 60% in terms of assets), and thus 
the shocks from the global financial market are very quickly transferred to the 
financial markets of these countries.
The remaining European countries are placed from the middle to the end of 
the rankings. The best ranked countries from this group (positioned in the first 
half of the rankings) are Malta (10th), Austria (12th), and Spain (14th). The remain-
ing countries are placed in the second half of our rankings. If we consider the 
European countries that were greatly affected by the last financial crisis, we can 
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find Italy (18th), Greece (20th) and Portugal (23rd). All countries in this group have 
some significant disadvantages, the most common being the coverage of the non-
performing loans ratio, ROA, ROE, the net interest margin, the cost-to-income 
ratio, and the debt-to equity ratio. Unlike the previous two groups, the strong 
points vary from country to country. The good performers in the area of total 
capital ratio are Malta, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland; 
France, Greece, Italy, and Austria in the area of the coverage of non-performing 
loans; Malta, Ireland, Sweden, and Denmark in the area of ROE; Greece and 
Cyprus in the area of net interest margin; Malta, Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Sweden, 
and Finland in the area of cost-to-income ratio; Austria, Ireland, Cyprus, and 
Greece in the area of debt-to-equity ratio; Finland and Malta in the area of the 
liquidity ratio.
In a strongly concentrated banking system (e.g. Finland), insolvency or other 
serious difficulties at a single large bank will lead to a substantial reduction in 
lending. Subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks comprise a large part of Fin-
land’s banking sector. Finnish banks’ deposit deficit – the difference between 
loans to the public and retail deposits – is one of the largest in the EU (Denmark 
ranks in the first position). Banks fund their deposit deficits through funding from 
the financial markets. The relative share of short-term market funding in Finnish 
banks’ funding acquisition has, however, declined in recent years, among oth-
ers on account of regulatory changes. Housing loans’ share of bank lending in 
Finland is one of the largest in Europe (once again, Denmark ranks in the first 
position). Large housing market crises often lead to recessions that generate loan 
losses from corporate lending too, and undermine the Finnish banks’ profitability 
(Bank of Finland 2015). The strong points are capitalisation, liquidity, a relatively 
low non-performing loans ratio, and the cost-to-income ratio. The weak points 
are high indebtedness and low profitability.
It is interesting to analyse the very bottom of the rankings, where the four 
last ranked countries are: the Netherlands, Great Britain, Denmark, and Germany 
25th–28th). 
The Dutch banking sector is relatively large in size, highly concentrated, and 
dominated by a small number of large national banks undertaking a wide range of 
activities. To a large extent, this structure results from the mergers that occurred 
at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, and from a number of market 
distortions and the unintended consequences of past policy initiatives. Examples 
include tax incentives contributing to a large sector size, such as the deductibility 
of interest payments on mortgages and business loans as well as competitive ad-
vantages and implicit state guarantees for banks already enjoying dominant mar-
ket positions. These encourage banks to grow larger, while discouraging them 
from specialising in the areas of their particular expertise. Since the start of the 
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crisis, the total size of the Dutch banking sector has decreased. Nevertheless, the 
sector remains large in proportion to the size of the economy from both a histori-
cal and an international perspective (De Nederlandsche Bank 2015). 
Public expenditure to provide capital support to banks and insurance companies 
was significant. Few large financial institutions survived without substantial state 
support, and state ownership or participation is now extensive. The most chal-
lenging vulnerabilities were represented by the high indebtedness of home buyers 
and the external risks related to banks’ cross-border activities. Dutch banks were 
exposed to US securitised mortgages, in part through their US subsidiaries, and 
were affected by the tightening of the inter-bank funding market (IMF 2011). 
Up to 2015, banks managed to improve their capital ratios. Driven by a low 
demand for credit and the disposal of non-core activities, banks have been de-
risking and de-leveraging their balance sheets. However, banks have not man-
aged to restore profitability to pre-crisis levels. Income has decreased as a result 
of the decreasing balance sheets, while costs have been high due to restructuring, 
and increased regulation. Although banks have improved their capital ratios, the 
current low level of profitability combined with additional regulatory reform has 
given rise to new challenges (KPMG 2016). 
After a significant growth during the crisis, the stock of the non-performing 
loans recorded a gradual fall during the next few years, as a result of a developed 
and deep non-performing loans market. Simultaneously, the De Nederlandsche 
Bank raised capital requirements, so the total capital ratio levels are above mini-
mum requirements and on a track to meet the Basel III requirements. As a result, 
the Netherlands has strong points in the area of non-performing loans and total 
capital ratio. All remaining indicators represent the obstacles of the Dutch bank-
ing system. The most pronounced among them are the debt-to-equity ratio and 
the coverage of non-performing loans, while the least significant limitation is 
ROE. Banks issued a significant number of hybrid debt instruments, which raised 
the risks. Furthermore, it led to the fall of bank’s share prices, resulting in a high 
Figure 6. The Netherlands: country profile
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level of debt-to-equity ratio. According to that indicator, the Netherlands is in 21st 
position. Also, the slowdown in economic activity influenced the drop of credit 
activities and lowering the non-performing loans, and the insufficient profitabil-
ity (resulting in the low level of the net interest margin, ROA and ROE). Given 
that UK banks are important trading partners for the Netherlands banks, Brexit 
is certain to impact the Dutch banking system, through market volatility and by 
raising risks.
Figure 7 indicates that the United Kingdom (26th) has an advantage merely in 
the area of non-performing loans.
For nearly two centuries, the British financial system has been a major centre 
of global finance and the source of many innovations, in particular in long-term 
finance and international banking. The rapidly growing scale of the British fi-
nancial system, its deregulation in 1987, and the recent financial crisis masked 
structural changes that have made the financial system less “functional” in inter-
mediating resources. Among the changes that led to such developments was the 
increasing level of leverage in the non-financial sectors of the economy. Domes-
tic sector credit to the private sector as a share of GDP almost doubled during 
1997–2007. In the corporate sector, prior to the financial crisis, access to bank 
debt was easy and at low risk margins. These funds were not channelled into pro-
ductive investments, but into real estate and financial asset markets. This huge 
expansion in mortgage lending was accompanied by house price inflation. The 
borrowings for consumption increased. Consumption fell after the crisis struck 
and was a major cause of the prolonged recession. The deregulation of the fi-
nancial system has increased the internationalisation of the financial system that 
became dominated by foreign financial and banking institutions. Domination by 
foreign banks and financial institutions makes regulation less effective. This in-
ternationalisation provides a conduit through which disturbances in all parts of 
the world are transmitted to the UK economy and created a dependence on the 
US Federal Reserve for support in coping with the recent financial crisis through 
swap agreements (Shabani et al. 2014). The banking crisis was rapidly transmit-
ted to the real economy, with the UK plunging into a sharp recession. After a few 
years of low credit activities, improved credit conditions in the UK over the last 
few years have gradually benefited the overall quality of the remaining portfo-
lios, leading to a low non-performing loans ratio, which is the only advantage 
of its banking system. UK banks sold their non-performing portfolios in order 
to obtain the “right size” of their balance sheets in response to new capital con-
strains and regulatory pressures. Although the share of the non-performing loans 
ratio in total loans has been reduced, the major disadvantage is the low level of 
the coverage of non-performing loans, predominantly as a result of Brexit. The 
immediate impact of the Brexit referendum was a period of heightened financial 
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market volatility, followed by sharp falls in some UK asset prices and banking 
sector equity prices, the value of bonds rose significantly and the pound sterling 
dropped to its lowest value against the US dollar for around 30 years. That also 
has put profitability under pressure. Bank profitability remained lacklustre, re-
flecting low interest rates, balance sheet de-risking, declining trading income, 
and – mainly for the largest banks – high legacy conduct and litigation provisions 
(IMF 2016). Figure 7 confirms this fact: ROA, ROE and the net interest margin 
are some of the great weaknesses of the UK banking system. Increase of the debt-
to-equity ratio and cost-to-income ratio, and the decrease of the total capital ratio 
are also results of such environment in banking sector.
Denmark is the penultimate country in our rankings. Denmark’s banking sys-
tem is made up of seven systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and 
a large number of small banks. The total assets of the Danish banking system are 
close to four times the GDP and the three largest banks make up 78% of total 
bank assets (OECD 2014). 
One of the reasons of the financial crisis in Denmark was the transition to new 
international accounting principles in 2005, according to which banks no longer 
had to make provisions for lending on the basis of a demonstrated risk of losses 
under the prudent accounting principle. Accordingly, the new accounting rules of 
2005 did not allow the build-up of “hidden” reserves, reducing thereby the buff-
ers and providing room for increased credit expansion. Another reason was the 
easing of capital requirements in connection with the implementation of the Basel 
II capital adequacy rules in 2007, under which some banks chose to utilise the 
easing for additional lending. Another reason was represented by a high increase 
of lending some years before the crisis erupted (Abildgren – Thomsen 2011).
Danish banking financing was based on foreign market financing and money 
market funds as well as bond issuances. This can be described as an altered busi-
ness model. During 2008–2010, the Danish banking sector faced a crisis as a 
result of great losses as well as severe liquidity challenges.
Figure 7. The UK: country profile
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In the face of the global financial crisis and the bursting of the housing market 
bubble, the authorities responded with six bank packages from October 2008 
to October 2013, involving capital injections, liquidity support, and government 
guarantees. Other measures taken to improve financial stability included the in-
troduction of a special resolution regime and of a credit register to which all 
banks must report information on their major customers, the reform of the deposit 
insurance scheme, and the strengthening of regulation and supervision in line 
with evolving reform at the global and EU levels (OECD 2014). As a result of 
these reforms, the Danish banking sector has generally become more robust in 
recent years. Figure 10 indicates that this country has three advantages, namely in 
the areas of non-performing loans, total capital ratio, and ROE, which are slightly 
above the EU average. The level of non-performing loans is moderate, amount-
ing to 3.4% of gross loans, which is far below the EU average (10.2%). The total 
capital ratio compares well with those of international peers, but lag behind those 
of some Nordic ones. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, Danish banks 
have slowly recovered. They had a negative ROE in 2008 and in 2009, but by 
mid-2016, this has improved, reaching 9.4%. The increase in earnings is primari-
ly driven by low loan impairment charges, lower costs, and higher net fee income 
(this country has the negative interest rates). The remaining indicators reflect the 
disadvantages of the Danish banking system, among which the most pronounced 
are the debt-to-equity ratio, coverage of non-performing loans, and net interest 
margin. Negative interest rates put a pressure on the net interest margin, placing 
this country in the 24th position according to that indicator. This country occupies 
the same position by the level of the debt-to-equity ratio. Low demand for new 
loans caused a low level of the coverage of non-performing loans ratio, plac-
ing Denmark in the 23rd position among EU countries by that indicator. Danish 
banks’ lending to households and companies in the United Kingdom is at a low 
level. Therefore, the systemic risk to Danish banks is limited.
Figure 8. Denmark: country profile
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Germany is the last ranked country among the EU-28. The German banking 
system is characterised by an original three-pillar structure: private commercial 
banks, public banks, and cooperative banks. 
During the crisis, the bigger commercial banks came very close to bankruptcy 
and had to be saved through restructurings. Currently, there are only few major 
players in the commercial banks sector. The public banking sector is organised 
territorially: cities and local authorities own local Sparkassen, while Länder (re-
gions) own Landesbanken. The last ones developed many operations during the 
last decade and they now compete directly with the commercial banks (Finance 
Watch 2014). In 2009, the capitalisation of banks rose due to a substantial pub-
lic support and because most banking balance sheets contracted once the crisis 
erupted. Sparkassen and cooperative banks are likely to be able to meet the new 
requirements of Basel III, while the regional and larger banks will have to make 
some adjustments. Although a formal public guarantee was removed in 2001 for 
public banks, the massive government recapitalisations of 2008 show that there 
is still an implicit guarantee for the private commercial banks considered as be-
ing “too big to fall” (Finance Watch 2014). The NPL ratio increased slightly after 
2008 for commercial banks and Landesbanken, but it was lower than in other Eu-
ropean countries. This country solved its problem with NPL by physical transfer 
or distressed assets with the provision of guarantees to cover the losses related to 
a specific portfolio of assets. These arrangements cap the losses borne by banks 
through an insurance mechanism until market conditions recover. As a direct re-
sult of this strategy, there has been a significant drop in the non-performing loans 
ratio and it is obvious from Figure 9 that Germany has an advantage in this area. 
The level of this ratio is 2.6%, almost twice lower than the EU average (5.4%). 
The most pronounced disadvantages are in the area of cost-to-income ratio and 
debt-to-equity ratio, and the least limiting factor is the liquidity assets ratio. This 
country has the highest cost-to-income ratio among EU counties. It reached the 
value of 77.1% and the problem is more obvious if it is compared with the EU 
Figure 9. Germany: country profile
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average, which amounts to 54%. Namely, higher staff costs and costs aimed at 
meeting regulatory requirements put a strain on the expenditure side, and the low 
level of profitability due to the low interest rate and the heavy dependence on 
interest income put a pressure on the revenue side. It should be emphasised that 
the cost-income ratio is lower for savings banks and cooperative banks than for 
the large commercial banks. Germany also displays low performances for debt-
to-equity ratio, which is mainly a result of Brexit. Market fluctuations in the im-
mediate aftermath of the referendum were characterised by large currency swings 
and significant equity price declines, particularly in bank stocks, putting pressure 
on the equity side. Simultaneously, debt recorded a sharp growth due to higher 
risks, resulting in the second largest debt-to-equity ratio among all EU banking 
systems, amounting to 19.2, far above the EU average (11.4%). The British vote 
to leave the EU had primarily hit large German banks, given their heavy exposure 
to London.
In order to obtain a better insight in the differences among EU countries, the 
ranking results are presented in the Geometrical Analysis for Interactive Assist-
ance (GAIA) plane too (Figure 10).
Figure 10. The GAIA plane
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It is obvious from Figure 10 that there are clusters of countries according to 
their similar characteristics. The GAIA plane offers a graphical interpretation of 
the PROMETHEE method and shows a clear picture of the observed problem. 
Based on the GAIA plane, it is possible and easy to determine the discriminative 
strength of each criterion as well as the aspects of consistency or inconsistency 
as the indicator of each alternative for all criteria. The alternatives are shown as 
squares, while the criteria are presented as axes with square endings. The eccen-
tricity of the position of a square criterion represents the strength of the influence 
of that criterion, while the similarity in preference between certain criteria is de-
fined with almost the same direction of these criteria’s axes. The closer to the axe 
direction of a single criterion, the more the alternative is in accordance with the 
criteria. The decision stick pi defines the compromising solution in accordance 
with all the given weight criteria.
Cluster 1 consists of CEE countries, which are the best ranked countries, so 
they are positioned in the direction of decision stick pi. Bulgaria and Romania, as 
the best ranked, are farthest from the origin point. The GAIA plane highlights that 
the main advantages of these countries are the debt-to-equity ratio, coverage of 
the non-performing loans and net income margin. Brexit has not influenced their 
banking sectors, given that they are relative close to other EU countries (although 
their banking sectors are growing fast) and that the UK does not have a signifi-
cant share in total banking assets. 
Cluster 2 consists of the Baltic States, Malta, and Ireland, as the small open 
banking markets. They are not in the direction of the decision stick pi, but they 
are near it, indicating that they are in the middle of the rankings. These countries 
are positioned in the direction of all remaining criteria axes, indicating that they 
have a significant advantage in those areas. The direct impact of Brexit on these 
countries is small, but there is an indirect effect through big foreign banks (mostly 
Scandinavian, except in Malta). Their banking markets are more open than those 
in CEE, but they are characterised by a high level of capitalisation and liquidity 
that make them relatively robust to shocks in the EU and global banking market. 
Cluster 3 includes all remaining countries. They are positioned opposite to 
decision stick pi, indicating that they have disadvantages in most of the observed 
criteria. The worst ranked Germany is exactly opposite to the decision stick and 
the farthest from the origin point. These are highly opened and interconnected 
banking markets that are greatly affected by Brexit, primarily through the sharp 
drop in share prices, high exposures, and the volatility of exchange rates. 
The European Banking Authority published a Risk Dashboard in mid-2016, 
where the EU banking systems are ranked in the low-risk, medium-risk, or high 
risk groups, according to the levels achieved for the banking solvability ratios, 
banking profitability ratios, credit risk ratios, and banking balance sheet structure 
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ratios. This report confirmed our cluster analysis and rankings according to the 
strong points and weak points we have underlined in our analysis. The main find-
ings of this report were as follows: 
•  Germany, Hungary, Austria, Spain, Italy, and EU area displayed a medium risk 
in the banking capitalisation area, with a Tier 1 capital ratio between 12–15%, 
while all the other CEE countries, the Baltic States, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
and Finland displayed a low risk, with a ratio above 15%. Portugal displayed a 
high risk with a Tier 1 capital ratio under 12%.
•  Most of the CEE countries displayed a high risk in the non-performing loans 
area, with levels above 8% (Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and 
Croatia). Poland, Slovakia, and the EU area displayed a medium risk in the 
non-performing loans area, with levels ranging between 3–8%. The Czech Re-
public, Germany, Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands displayed a low risk, 
with levels under 3%.
•  In the coverage ratio of non-performing loans area, all CEE countries (except 
Slovakia that displayed a medium risk) displayed a low risk, with levels above 
55%. The EU area displayed a medium risk with a level of 43%. Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands displayed a high risk, with levels below 
40%.
•  In the banking indebtedness area (debt-equity ratio), all CEE countries dis-
played a low risk, with levels under 12%, while the EU area, Germany, Den-
mark, Finland, and the Netherlands displayed a high risk, with levels above 
15%.
•  In the banking cost efficiency area (cost-income ratio), Finland, Romania, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic displayed a low risk, with lev-
els below 50%. Slovenia, Demark, and Poland displayed a medium risk, with 
levels ranging between 50–60%, while Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
and the EU area displayed a high risk, with levels above 60%.
•  In the banking profitability area (ROE), all 8 CEE countries displayed a low 
risk, with levels above 10%. Denmark, Finland, and the Netherlands displayed 
a medium risk, with levels ranging between 6–10%, while the EU area stays 
in the high-risk area, with a level slightly below 6%, just like Germany that 
displayed the lowest level of 2.7%.
According to the European Banking Authority classifications, the European 
banking sectors we ranked in the last positions in our top list display great prob-
lems in the indebtedness area and in the coverage of non-performing loans area, 
while the CEE banking sectors we ranked on the first positions, as they display 
great problems in the non-performing loans area. 
Finally, a general conclusion of our research is that Vollmer (2016), Iwanicz-
Drozdowska et al. (2016), and Schiereck et al. (2016) were right when they em-
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phasised that the ECB should strengthen its capacities in order to obtain a unique 
approach to bank supervision in all EU countries and that for now, non-EMU 
members, especially the CEE countries, should reconsider their current position 
towards European Banking Union membership, given the presently stable finan-
cial sectors in these countries, even in the case of Brexit. 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
EU banking systems faced numerous challenges during the last decade. These 
disturbances were transferred very quickly from one financial market to others. 
Brexit is one of the last events that will certainly affect all aspects of economy, 
and especially bank’s performances. 
In order to define and implement the most effective measures to overcome the 
current situation, policy-makers in the ECB must identify not just the main weak-
nesses of each banking system, but also their strong points. This would enable the 
formulation of a comprehensive and coherent set of measures that will neutralise 
negative effects and support the strengths of each banking system. A preliminary 
research along these lines requires the application of multi-criteria analysis, con-
sidering that regulators have to consider a broad variety of indicators of systemic 
importance. This paper is an example of such an analysis. The application of the 
PROMETHEE II method in combination with the entropy model enabled the 
examination of each EU banking system and their order by all chosen character-
istics immediately after the UK voted to exit the EU.
Our analysis found that CEE banking systems are the best performers accord-
ing to the observed criteria. These countries have advantages in almost all indica-
tors, except those that indicate their capitalisation and liquidity. The last ranked 
country is Germany. The problem of the German banking sector is not repre-
sented by the bad loans ratio that is under the EU average, but its persistent lack 
of profitability for a long time, even before the crisis. 
It is interesting that almost all EMU members are placed at the end of the rank-
ing. The exceptions are Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia, which are in the first 
third of the ranked countries. There are many reasons for this. A deeper recession 
in Europe than in the US, doubts over the survival of the EMU and Banking Un-
ion, weak domestic governments, the new rules in the European financial market, 
weaker banking capital positions, and much more determined market interven-
tions by the US Fed against the ECB affected the Europeans banks and they were 
unable to recover rapidly after the crisis. Still, the supervising authorities of the 
CEE banking systems should better coordinate their actions with the ECB’s ac-
tions or with the measures adopted by the Western European supervising authori-
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ties because the main investors in the CEE banking systems come from the euro 
zone member states. CEE banking countries display a lower exposure to UK 
banks, and thus Brexit will not greatly affect them. Still, CEE banking systems 
are exposed to the Italian banks and that could threaten them in the light of the 
new developments on the Italian banking market.
The main indicator showing the banks’ resilience in the face of a potential 
crisis is bank capitalisation. There have been some improvements in this segment 
during recent years, due to the growth in the capital (mainly driven by increase 
of retained earnings) and the slight decrease of risk-weighted assets, primarily its 
market risk components. Total capital ratio has doubled after the crisis, especially 
during 2012–2016, but there is still considerable room for further progress. A bet-
ter capitalisation and an improvement in the banking assets quality levels mask 
country specific weaknesses, and the German, Portuguese, and even Italian or 
Greek banking sectors still have work to do in this area. 
The ECB should reassess its regulatory approach and the rules about state aid 
should not be relaxed as a result of the recent crisis in Italian or Portuguese bank-
ing sectors. The US recapitalised its banks, bad loans were written down, and a 
new regulatory framework was designed. Europe did not do this and if it refuses 
to do so, Brexit can prove to be a financial catastrophe. Brexit will reduce the 
profitability of UK subsidiary and branches and will cause uncertainty over the 
business model in the short run.
Another great problem is represented by the fact that some of the European 
banking sectors still have high levels of non-performing loans (Slovenia, Greece, 
Cyprus, and Portugal), which restrict loan growth and decrease banking profit-
ability. Some of them could further improve their legal frameworks in order to 
deal with the non-performing loans. Also, most of them do not have a sufficiently 
developed and deep non-performing loans market, therefore policy-makers in 
these countries should, with the assistance of the EBC, establish institutions and 
regulations necessary for the development of that financial market segment.
Finally, the profitability of banking sectors, especially in the Western Euro-
pean countries, is not on the satisfactory level. Namely, the ECB has tried to boost 
the recovery of the EU economies by low interest rates, a strategy that has had 
a greater impact on banking sectors with tougher competition. In this sense, the 
new regulatory and macroeconomic environment has put pressure on their profit-
ability because for the large banks in the EU area, net interest income makes up, 
on average, more than half their total income. The deterioration in banks’ profit-
ability after Brexit is set to last for longer. Thus, banks will need to adopt more 
aggressive cost management strategies than in the past and to focus on increasing 
their other revenues (from fees gained by releasing new products or attracting 
new clients) in order to obtain profitable business in the future. 
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